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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920126-CA
Priority No. 2

RENE RUIZ,
De fendant/Appe11ant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State's argument that magistrates should issue
nighttime search warrants, and reviewing courts should affirm the
issuance of no-knock nighttime search warrants, if there is "some
evidence," but not probable cause justifying the no-knock nighttime
authorizations, is at odds with Utah statutes and constitutional
law.
The warrant in this case failed to meet constitutional
particularity requirements and was not supported by probable cause.
The lack of probable cause stems from the fact that the affidavit
supporting the warrant refers to two separate apartments (8 and 18)
when the warrant authorizes the search of one apartment (8); from
the undisclosed age of most of the information in the affidavit; and
from the failure of the affidavit to establish the reliability,
veracity, and/or bases of knowledge of the confidential informants.
The warrant should not have authorized a no-knock nighttime search.
The fact that the magistrate signed this patently defective warrant

demonstrates that the magistrate was not acting as a neutral and
detached arbiter of probable cause.
The State's procedural arguments concerning waiver of
issues and the propriety of summary affirmance are factually and
legally unpersuasive.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT
DE NOVO. WITHOUT DEFERENCE TO THE MAGISTRATE.
In response to Mr. Ruiz's contention that this Court should
review the search warrant affidavit in his case without deference to
the magistrate and determine whether the affidavit provided probable
cause for the issuance of a no-knock nighttime search warrant, the
State argues that 1) Mr. Ruiz's legal authority is wanting, 2)
police deserve deference because they have expertise in performing
searches and are "the ones at risk" in serving the warrants, and 3)
the non-deferential "some evidence" standard proposed by the State
will promote consistent results.

Respondent's brief at 15-16.

The State's complaint about lack of authority for de novo
review of no-knock nighttime search warrants is based on a
misperception that Mr. Ruiz is challenging solely the means of
executing the search warrant in this case, and is not challenging
probable cause for the search warrant.1

1. See Respondent's brief at 14-15 ("[Weaver] deals solely
with the question of probable cause to issue a warrant. This issue,
again, is not presented on this appeal."). See also Respondent's
brief at 3 ("[D]efendant does not challenge the underlying probable
cause finding.").
-2 -

To the extent that Judge Orme's Weaver concurrence might be
limited in scope to the review of probable cause for search
warrants, rather than to the review of no-knock and nighttime
authorizations, it is persuasive in this case, where probable cause
for the warrant is challenged and lacking.

One aspect of Mr. Ruiz's

no probable cause argument, discussed at pages 7, 20, 21 and 23-24
of his opening brief, is that the search warrant affidavit refers to
two separate apartments —

#8 and #18, while the warrant authorizes

the search for one apartment —

#8. Another aspect of Mr. Ruiz's no

probable cause argument, discussed at pages 21 and 22 of the opening
brief, is that the affidavit fails to show an adequate basis of
knowledge for and the credibility of the confidential informants.
Another aspect of Mr. Ruiz's no probable cause argument, discussed
at page 22 of the opening brief, is that the majority of the
information in the affidavit is not tied to any date demonstrating
probable cause at the time of the search.

Further, the warrant

fails to meet constitutional particularity requirements.

As is

discussed at pages 19 and 20 of his opening brief, the warrant
authorizes the search for and seizure of "U.S. Currency, and all
items which are determined to be collateral or proceeds from
narcotics transactions," granting the police total discretion to
search for and seize virtually anything they pleased.

The

discrepancy between the apartments mentioned in the affidavit and
the warrant also demonstrates a lack of constitutional
particularity.

Because the issuance of the warrant was improper,

regardless of the no-knock nighttime authorizations, Judge Orme's
-3 -

Weaver concurrence continues to be persuasive authority for
straightforward non-deferential review of the warrant in this case.
Additional authority for the proposition that reviewing
courts owe no deference to magistrates in reviewing the issuance of
no-knock nighttime search warrants is found in State v. Humphrey,
823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), where the Utah Supreme Court ruled that
district courts are to review magistrates# probable cause findings
without deference in the context of bindover orders.

Id. at 466.

Magistrates are ministerial officers who do not act as courts, and
courts have the capacity and should have the obligation to review
the magistrates' legal conclusions as to probable cause for search
warrants by reviewing the information falling within the four
corners of any search warrant and affidavit to determine whether the
evidence upon which a criminal case is premised was legally seized.
Cf. Humphrey at 466-467.
The State's argument that appellate review should be
deferential to the magistrates because police have expertise in
performing searches and are "the ones at risk11 in serving the
warrants, respondent's brief at 15, is flawed.

Assuming arguendo

that police deserve deference in obtaining no-knock nighttime
authorizations, such deference would not carry over to the
magistrates' probable cause determinations in issuing warrants
because magistrates must be separate, neutral and detached from the
police, and reviewing courts must insure this rule.
Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939).

The police are not the only ones

at risk in the execution of warrants.
-4

E.g. Allen v.

Courts have historically been

alert to the need for careful consideration of no-knock nighttime
searches because the courts have recognized that no-knock nighttime
searches threaten the safety of not only the police, but also of the
suspects and innocent bystanders and property and privacy and
solitude.

See brief of appellant at 17. Furthermore, an officer's

willingness to endanger herself does not earn the officer carte
blanche to override the constitutions, or absolve the courts of
their duties to see that the officer comports with her duty to
conduct herself within constitutional bounds.

See id.

The State's argument that the non-deferential "some
evidence" standard proposed by the State would promote consistent
results, respondent's brief at 16, is correct in that the standard
would allow the State to successfully defend the issuance of
no-knock nighttime authorizations in virtually every case.

Such

whitewashing would be inconsistent with numerous Fourth Amendment
values, including the preservation of the integrity of the courts.
See State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990)(courts should not
be party to lawless invasions of citizens' rights); State v. Vigil,
815 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (Utah App. 1991)(development of common law
is best served when appellate courts fully engage all appellate
resources).
In short, this Court should hold under Article I section 14
of the Utah Constitution that courts reviewing the issuance of
no-knock nighttime search warrants are to do so by simply reading
the search warrants and affidavits, to determine if there is

-5 -

probable cause for the issuance of the no-knock nighttime search
warrants.

Brief of appellant at 8-13.

II.
MAGISTRATES MUST HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE
TO ISSUE NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANTS.
The State argues that while search warrants must be
supported by probable cause, when Utah magistrates authorize the
nighttime execution of the warrants, magistrates should not require
probable cause for the nighttime authorizations, but merely require
"some evidence," or evidence meeting a "reasonable suspicion"
standard.

Respondent's brief at 12-14.

It is the State's rationale

that because a finding of probable cause must underlie the issuance
of a warrant, and because a warrant will result in some intrusion on
one's privacy rights, magistrates should defer to the police as to
the manner of execution of warrants once some intrusion has been
justified by a search warrant based on probable cause.
brief at 12-13.

Respondent's

In other words, as long as there is probable cause

for warrants, magistrates should not much concern themselves with
whether a police officer approaches a home in the daytime, knocks on
the door, explains her authority and purpose, and proceeds to
search, or whether a team of unidentifiable police officers go
breaking and entering into and looting a person's home with guns
drawn in the middle of the night.
The State and Federal Constitutions both explicitly require
reasonable searches and probable cause for all search warrants.
Because no-knock nighttime searches are more intrusive, more
-6 -

dangerous and more prone to constitutional unreasonableness than
other searches, the constitutions and logic compel as a minimum a
showing of probable cause to justify no-knock nighttime search
warrants, and certainly do not tolerate the miniscule "some
evidence" standard proposed by the State.2
The cases the State cites in support of its "some evidence"
standard are inapposite or misinterpreted.

In Dalia v. United

States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979), cited in respondent's brief at 13, the
Court held, in pertinent part, that the Fourth Amendment did not
require courts issuing wiretap orders under federal law to
explicitly authorize covert entry for installation of the wiretap
equipment.

Id. at 257-259.

Dalia's holding does not support the

argument that magistrates should defer to the police in no-knock
nighttime search warrant cases because the facts at issue in
wiretapping are different from the facts at issue in no-knock
nighttime cases.

Covert entry is essential to any successful

wiretap and would necessarily be considered by a judge issuing a
wiretap order, and covert entry does not pose the dangers that
inhere in no-knock nighttime searches.

See LaFave, Search and

Seizure, supplement §4.8 at 53-54.
United States v. Searp. 586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1978), does
not support the State's "some evidence" standard, but demonstrates
why the Dalia wiretap analysis does not apply in the context of
nighttime searches.

In Searp. the police obtained at night

2. See generally Lafave, Search and Seizure, §§4.7 and 4.8
at pages 260, 263-276, 270-280, 287-290; supplement, §4.8 at 49-54.
-7 -

a warrant authorizing an immediate search of a woman's home, but
failed to obtain an explicit authorization for a nighttime search.
Id. at 1121-1122.

The court held that the officers violated federal

law in executing the search warrant at night without obtaining an
explicit nighttime authorization.

Id.

While the State's quotation

of Searp at page 14 of the respondent's brief is correct, when read
in context, it demonstrates the Searp Court's awareness of the need
for careful consideration of nighttime searches by those issuing
nighttime warrants.

The opinion states,

The federal Rule requires explicit authorization
for a night search, and "reasonable cause shown"
to the issuing magistrate justifying the unusual
intrusion of a search at night. . . . The Rule
requires only some factual basis for a prudent
conclusion that the greater intrusiveness of a
nighttime search is justified by the exigencies
of the situation. The procedural reguirements of
the Rule ensure that the fact that a nighttime
search is contemplated by the police is brought
to the attention of a magistrate and that he or
she consciously decide whether such a
particularly abrasive instrusion is called for in
a given situation.
Id. at 1121 (emphasis added).

Rather than assuming that the judge

who signed the warrant at 11:27 p.m. to be executed immediately had
necessarily considered the nighttime execution of the warrant, as
would have been done under a Dalia approach, the Searp court
indicated that a record of the judge's explicit consideration of an
adequate justification for an intrusive nighttime search was
essential.

The court stated,

In this case, even if we were to accept the
argument that the preprinted word "immediately"
meant more than the phrase "forthwith," commonly
used in warrants, and could suffice as explicit
-8 -

authority for a night search in a warrant issued
at night, there is no record of any "reasonable
cause shown" to justify a nighttime search. The
affidavit contains no request for a night search,
and discloses no facts which would justify such a
search, particularly of a private home occupied
by a lone woman who was not suspected of being a
participant in the crime.
To hold under these circumstances that there
has been compliance would eviscerate a federal
rule intended to be a substantial protection
against unnecessarily abrasive behavior by the
police. . . . The Rule is so constructed that it
simply cannot be complied with by chance, because
it requires, first, conscious recognition and
consideration of the fact that an extraordinary
search is contemplated, and secondly, some record
of that consideration in the affidavits and the
warrant itself.
Id. at 1121-1122 (emphasis added).
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1990), does explain
the reasonable suspicion standard, respondent's brief at 13, a
standard that must be met in order to justify an officer's detention
and questioning of a citizen.

Menke, however, does nothing to

justify the State's position that this standard, or a "some
evidence" standard, should be the threshold to justify a nighttime
search, which radically exceeds the scope of a level two Terry stop.
The State cites State v. Lee

633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981),

for the proposition that "[e]fforts to avoid the detection of
criminal activity do not create a[n] expectation that such activity
will remain 'private.'"

Respondent's brief at 14.

Lee is a plain

view case, wherein the defendant had placed stolen property in the
back of his truck, where the property was clearly visible through a
window.

It was in this context that the court explained that Mr.

-9 -

Lee's mere desire to avoid detection of criminal activity was an
insufficient basis to establish a privacy interest in the property,
which Mr. Lee had left in the officer's plain view.

Id. at 51.

Lee

is inapposite to the State's argument that magistrates should issue
no-knock nighttime warrants if there is "some evidence" to justify
the no-knock nighttime authorizations.
The State's argument that a reasonable suspicion or "some
evidence" standard is the appropriate standard for a magistrate to
follow under Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5 (1), which requires
reasonable cause for a nighttime search fails to appreciate prior
Utah caselaw.

When Utah statutes codify principles of

constitutional law, such as the need for probable cause to search
and seize, Utah Courts consistently construe the statutory term
"reasonable cause" to mean probable cause.3

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d

730 (Utah App. 1991), correctly interprets this statute as requiring
a particularized showing that a search is required at night because
of nighttime destruction of property, or for other good reason.

Id.

at 733.
It is important to note that the State apparently does not
argue for this reasonable suspicion standard in the issuance of
no-knock warrants.

See Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2)(in order

to issue a no-knock warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the

3. The State cited State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236
(Utah App. 1989)(interpreting warrantless arrest statute). See also
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986)(same); State v. Cole, 674
P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983)(same); and State v. Hatcher, 495 P.2d
1259, 1260 (1972)(same).
-10-

affidavit or supplemental record which provide "proof, under oath,
that the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of,
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if
notice were given.")(emphasis added).

III.
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND AFFIDAVIT
WERE FATALLY DEFECTIVE.
The State argues that the warrant was supported by probable
cause because of the confidential informant's controlled buy from
Mr. Ruiz's apartment seven days prior to the search.
brief at 3-4.

Respondent's

The controlled buy was from an unspecified person or

persons in that apartment, and yet the warrant authorized the search
of Mr. Ruiz and his apartment.

Mr. Ruiz's residence in the

apartment where a controlled buy occurred sometime in the week prior
to the issuance of the warrant does not necessarily establish
probable cause to search him or his apartment.

See Ybarra v.

Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)("a search or seizure of a person
must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to
that person [and] [t]his requirement cannot be undercut or avoided
by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists
probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises
where the person may happen to be11); Ashley v. State. 241 N.E.2d 264
(Ind. 1968)(even though probable cause may have once existed for
searching a building, probable cause no longer exists after an 8 day
lapse because drugs could have been moved).

See also Utah Code Ann.

section 77-23-3 (stating conditions precedent to and limitation of
-11-

warrants issued wherein person or entity in possession of illegal
evidence is not a probable cause suspect).
More importantly, the State fails to note defects in the
warrant and affidavit which preclude a finding of probable cause,
and which demonstrate that the magistrate acted as a rubberstamp in
signing the search warrant without addressing these defects.
The State's only mention of the discrepancy between the
warrant's authorization of a search of apartment #8, and the
affidavit's reference to apartments #8 and #18 is a waiver argument
found at page 7 note 2 of the respondent's brief, wherein the State
refers to Mr, Ruiz's contentions about the discrepancy as a
"particularity argument."

The waiver aspect of the State's argument

is addressed in Point IV of this brief, but the State's limited view
of the legal impact of the discrepancy must be addressed.

The

discrepancy demonstrates a failure of the warrant to meet
constitutional particularity requirements.

See e.g. Dalia v. United

States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979)("[W]arrants must particularly
describe the things to be seized, as well as the place to be
searched.")(citation omitted).

However, the discrepancy also

demonstrates that the magistrate was not acting as a neutral and
detached arbiter of probable cause in signing the warrant without
addressing the discrepancy.

See e.g. id. ("[W]arrants must be

issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates.").

The discrepancy

also goes to the absence of probable cause for the search and the
no-knock nighttime authorizations.

The information in the affidavit

relating to apartment #8 mentions one controlled buy by a
-12-

confidential informant from (an) unspecified person(s).

The

information in the affidavit relating to rumors of a Rene Montoya
dealing in large quantities of drugs, threatening to use a gun to
protect his drugs, and countersurveillance is tied to apartment
#18.

See brief of appellant at 20-21; Dalia, supra (w[T]hose

seeking the warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate their
probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a
particular apprehension or conviction for a particular
offense.")(citations omitted).
The State's characterization of Mr. Ruiz's contentions
about the warrant's authorization of a search for "U.S. Currency,
and all items which are determined to be collateral or proceeds from
narcotics transactions" as a particularity argument again places an
undue limitation on the legal impact of the defect.

While this

phrase in the warrant did transform the warrant into an illegal
general warrant, in violation of the particularity rule, see Dalia,
supra. the fact that the magistrate signed the warrant without
questioning or eliminating this improper language demonstrates a
failure of the magistrate to function as a neutral and detached
arbiter of probable cause, as well.

Id.

Again the State does not

respond on the merits to the overbreadth of the warrant, but relies
on a waiver argument in a footnote, which will be addressed in Point
IV of this brief.
The State makes no response whatsoever to Mr. Ruiz's
contention that the affidavit is deficient in probable cause because
it provides an inadequate showing of the reliability, veracity,
-13-

and/or bases of knowledge of the confidential informants.

See

appellant's brief at 21-22.
The State makes no response whatsoever to Mr. Ruiz's
contention that the affidavit fails to establish probable cause at
the time of the search because the majority of the information in
the affidavit is not tied to any date.

See appellant's brief at 22.

The State's argument that the no-knock nighttime search was
appropriate because of reports of countersurveillance, and the
State's inference that the countersurveillance meant that evidence
would be destroyed if the officers approached in the daytime,
respondent's brief at 17, fail to note that the countersurveillance
was apparently observed at night, logically counselling against a
nighttime execution of the warrant.

See appellant's brief at 24-25.

The State's argument that the no-knock nighttime search was
proper because of the informants' statements that Rene was armed and
would defend his drugs, overlooks the fact that this information was
tied to apartment #18 in the affidavit, while the warrant authorized
search of apartment #8.

See Appellant's brief at 23-24.

The

State's reliance on the officer's general accusation that drug
dealers are frequently armed, respondent's brief at 17, fails to
account for the rule that a magistrate issuing a warrant must do so
on the basis of independent facts, and may not rely on the general
beliefs of the officer.

E.g. Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920,

924-925 (Utah 1939)("A warrant to search and seize, which follows
upon a statement based solely upon the belief of the affiant, rests

-14-

upon the reasoning of the affiant, based upon the secret facts of
which he may have knowledge, and the conclusion which results from
such reasoning is affiant's, not that of the judicial officer.

The

judicial process to ascertain probable cause is then transferred
from the judicial officer to the affiant.
no such thing.")(citation omitted).

The Constitution permits

See also Giordanello v. United

States, 357 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1958) (arrest warrant); Acruilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 111-14 (1964); Nathanson v. United States.
290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933); Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).

IV.
THIS CASE IS PROCEDURALLY RIPE
FOR REVERSAL ON THE MERITS.
Despite the fact that the specifics of the trial court's
ruling were never resolved in the trial court and therefore are not
before this court on review, see opening brief of appellant at 3 n.l
and respondent's brief at 6 n.l, the State argues that Mr. Ruiz may
not address various issues before this Court because they were
waived in the trial court.

The State argues that Mr. Ruiz has

waived the issue concerning the absence of justification for the
no-knock authorization, and that Mr. Ruiz has also waived issues
relating to the discrepancy between the apartment number identified
in the warrant and the apartment numbers in the affidavit, and to
the warrant's authorization of a general search and seizure.
Respondent's brief at 7 and n.l.
The first reason to reject the waiver arguments is that in
reviewing the issuance of search warrants, this Court reviews the
-15-

search warrant and affidavit, without regard to the trial court's
analysis.

E.g. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991).

While the focus of the argument in the trial court was on
the nighttime authorization, the motion to suppress alleged
violations of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the nighttime
statute, and referred to and provided a copy of State v. Rowe, 806
P.2d 730 (Utah App.), cert, granted. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), which
fully discusses the issuance of no-knock nighttime warrants.

The

parties repeatedly indicated that it was proper for the trial court
to consider all materials within the warrant and affidavit, which
were both presented to the trial court fe.g. T. 4, 10). The parties
discussed the justification for the no-knock authorization before
the trial court fe.g. T. 18), and the trial court referred to the
no-knock justification in the search warrant affidavit during the
argument and in his ruling (T. 10, 13, 21), discussed the dangers
posed by no-knock nighttime searches (T. 12, 18-19), and discussed
what the court perceived as evidence of a need for a no-knock
warrant in this case (T. 14, 21). The trial court apparently
reviewed the entire warrant and affidavit, and eventually ruled that
the warrant was properly issued (T. 18-21).

The trial court had a

full opportunity to address the shortcomings in the warrant and
affidavit, and this Court need not refer to the court's analysis in
reviewing the search warrant and affidavit.

Weaver, supra.

Even if the waiver doctrine could apply to arguments about
the contents of a search warrant and affidavit on review before this
-16-

Court, the shortcomings in this affidavit and warrant are plain on
the face of the documents before this Court, and would merit plain
error review.

See Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) (explaining plain

error doctrine); State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert.
denied. 493 U.S. 813 (1989)(same).
The State's argument that this Court's disposition of this
case on the merits would result in an advisory opinion because the
parties stipulated not to present evidence concerning the execution
of the search warrant (T.6/14/91 4), respondent's brief at 11, fails
to appreciate the distinction between challenges to the issuance of
warrants, which seek to correct errant magistrates (and police
presenting the defective warrants and affidavits), and challenges to
the reasonableness of the execution of searches, which seek to
correct police misbehavior.

See Utah Constitution Article I section

14 (requiring both reasonable searches and the proper issuance of
warrants); United States Constitution, Amendment IV (same).

E.g.

State v. Avala. 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah App. 1988)(defendant
challenged search warrant for lack of probable cause established in
the supporting affidavit, and the reasonableness of the search of
his person).

Mr. Ruiz is not challenging the reasonableness of the

search; he is arguing that the search should not have occurred at
all because the warrant and affidavit were deficient and should not
have been issued by the magistrate.
The State cites States v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988),
and People v. Barber. 449 N.Y.S.2d 140 (N.Y.App. Div. 1982), for the
proposition that the absence of evidence that the police conducted a
-17-

no-knock nighttime search in this case precludes this Court from
addressing the propriety of the magistrate's issuance of the
no-knock nighttime warrant.

Respondent's brief at 8-9.

Neither

Buck nor Barber establishes a burden on a defendant challenging the
issuance of a search warrant to make an evidentiary showing of the
execution of the search.

If the State wished to contest Mr. Ruiz's

motion by showing that the warrant was not executed as authorized,
the State should have presented the necessary evidence in the trial
court.

Compare the stipulation of the parties in this case that no

evidence was necessary to the motion (T.6/14/91 4), with State v.
Buck. 756 P.2d at 701 (evidence demonstrated facts of execution of
search), and People v. Barber at 145 (same).
The State's argument that this Court is not in a position
to evaluate the propriety of excluding the evidence in the absence
of the facts surrounding the execution of the warrant, respondent's
brief at 10, fails to recognize that it is the State's burden to
establish facts demonstrating an exception to the exclusionary rule,
which applies because Mr. Ruiz has demonstrated a fourth amendment
violation.

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987).4

In the instant case, Mr. Ruiz moved to suppress the
evidence seized by the police, alleging violations of his statutory

4. The good faith exception would not apply in this case
because the magistrate wholly abandoned his role as a neutral and
detached magistrate, because the warrant is lacking in
particularity, and because the warrant was so deficient that an
officer could not reasonably rely on it. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
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rights and his fourth amendment and Article I section 14 rights. In
support of this motion, the trial court received in evidence a copy
of the search warrant and affidavit.

Mr. Ruiz has carried his

burden in his challenge to the warrant and affidavit.

State v.

Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1978).

V.
SUPPRESSION IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY.
The State challenges State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah
App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), arguing that
suppression of evidence may not be necessary in cases involving
improper nighttime searches.

Respondent's brief at 10 and n.3.

Rowe correctly recognizes that violation of the nighttime
search warrant requirements requires suppression of evidence, given
the historical recognition of the dangers and extreme intrusions
posed by nighttime searches.
notes.

Id. at 738-739 and accompanying

The Rowe court properly recognized that suppression is the

appropriate remedy under the Utah statutory scheme, and also
properly recognized that the Utah statutory scheme may codify
constitutional law governing nighttime searches.

Id.

In his

concurring Rowe opinion, Judge Garff correctly reiterated the need
for a magistrate's careful examination of nighttime search warrants
prior to their issuance.

Id. at 740.

It appears that under the Utah statutory scheme,
suppression is the presumptive remedy for violations of the search
warrants chapter.

The legislature explicitly notes when violations
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of the chapter shall not result in suppression, implicitly presuming
suppression for other violations.

Compare Utah Code Ann. section

77-23-6 ("Failure to give or leave a receipt shall not render the
evidence seized inadmissible at trial.11) with Utah Code Ann. section
77-23-10(2)(no-knock statute; does not prohibit suppression), and
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1)(nighttime statute; does not
prohibit suppression).5
The cases upon which the State relies in challenging Rowe
were not decided under the Utah search and seizure statutory scheme,
do not involve the improper issuance of no-knock nighttime search
warrants, and are thus inapposite.6
Given the state constitutional rights to life, privacy,
property and the proper issuance of warrants, which are all at stake
in no-knock nighttime search cases, this Court should hold under

5. While Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-12 indicates that
"property or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may not be
suppressed at a motion, trial, or other proceedings unless the
unlawful conduct of the peace officer is shown to be substantial,"
it appears that this statute, which is part of the Fourth Amendment
Enforcement Act, is no longer in effect, inasmuch as the Utah
Supreme Court struck as unconstitutional a different provision of
the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act, and the act indicates that the
provisions are not severable, but fall together if one provision is
stricken. See State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987).
6. See State v. Fixel. 744 P.2d 1366, 1368-1369 (Utah
1987)(case involved police officer acting outside of his statutory
geographical jurisdiction; did not involve constitutional violation;
"Unfortunately, the legislature has not seen fit to enact a
statutory remedy."); United States v. Searp. 586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir.
1978)(case involved police officers performing nighttime search
without warrant authorization, in violation of federal rule).
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Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution that suppression is
the appropriate remedy for the improper issuance of no-knock
nighttime search warrants.7

This rule will encourage police and

prosecutors to seek no-knock nighttime search warrants in properly
limited circumstances and to do so carefully, and will also
encourage magistrates to review the affidavits seeking no-knock
nighttime searches with appropriate care.8

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of
Mr. Ruiz's motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings.

7. See Constitution of Utah, Article I section 1 ("All men
have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property[.],f) ;
Article I section 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law."); Article I section 14
("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.").
8. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991),
Appendix at 741-743 (history of federal exclusionary rule and public
policy call for suppression in cases involving improper issuance of
warrants); State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 185 (Utah 1987)(court
reserves judgment on whether or not United States Supreme Court
correctly views the purpose of the exclusionary rule as solely to
prevent police misconduct); State v. LaRocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-73
(Utah 1990)(plurality)(noting that federal exclusionary rule has
been viewed as not only deterring police misconduct, but also as a
constitutionally-required constitutional enforcement mechanism, and
reserving question of purposes to be served by Utah exclusionary
rule, which, unlike the federal fourth amendment exclusionary rule,
currently applies whenever Article I section 14 is violated).
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